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Afghan Presidential Elections:  
A mirror of self-deception
Judgement over the 20 August Afghan elections has 
varied widely among observers. The most critical has 
been the Free and Fair Election Foundation, which 
reported widespread fraud. The EU observers, by 
contrast, judged that the elections were ‘free and 
fair’ despite widespread violence. Most diplomats 
congratulated Afghanistan over a voter turnout 
estimated at 40-50%, which despite being well below 
the official 70% of 2004 is believed to be acceptable in 
the face of ‘widespread’ violence. 
In reality, violence on election day was quite limited, with a 
total of 26 fatalities including insurgents and Afghan security 
forces; several civilian casualties were the result of long-
distance rocket firing. It is obvious that the Taliban could 
have done much more (worse) had they been determined 
to disrupt the elections. 
Instead, the Taliban leadership has largely confined itself to 
rhetorically hostile statements, probably considering that 
the elections did not represent a threat to its strategic and 
political interests. When diplomats and observers try to sell 
the elections as free and fair and as an achievement in the 
face of extremist violence, they have mainly in mind their 
home constituencies in Europe and America; the Afghan 
public had low expectations from the beginning since voter 
registration cards were openly for sale in the bazaars and the 
registration of under-age voters was widespread, having been 
estimated at as much as 20% of the total. In some Pashtun-
populated provinces expected to support Karzai, large scale 
proxy registration and voting on ‘behalf’ of women was 
observed. In many cases the police reportedly cooperated in 
organising the fraud. Although it will never be possible to 
tell with certainty, the fraud seems to have been on a scale 
comparable with Ahmadinejad’s in Iran, a few months ago.
However, the main problem with Friday’s elections is not that 
there was widespread fraud. In the context of an ongoing 
and worsening insurgency, which is beginning to look like 
a civil war, even the most committed statesman would 
probably have made recourse to fraud to secure stability and 
continuity over chaos. If Karzai cheated, his reasons are at least 
understandable. The problem is instead with the expectation, 
originally entertained by the Bush administration but then 
transmitted to its successor in Washington and to its European 
allies, that these elections would have improved the prospects 
of stabilising Afghanistan, by somehow legitimising a political 
system imported from abroad and demonstrating the rewards 
of competing for power peacefully. Such a belief may have 
been held only half-heartedly, but nonetheless during 2008 
and 2009 it shaped the planning and the behaviour of the 
international coalition operating in Afghanistan. 
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s The post-elections controversy was briefly frozen as the 
candidates wait for the announcement of the Electoral 
Commission, but on Sunday main challenger Abdullah openly 
accused the Karzai camp of widespread fraud. Unless Abdullah 
backs down soon, it might well be that the idea of peaceful 
competition for power will end up completely discredited 
rather then strengthened. The unequivocal evidence of fraud 
offers the defeated candidates the perfect justification for 
their defeat in any case, whether their chances were genuine 
or not. The diatribe is not likely to lead to a civil war, but will 
discredit what is left to be discredited of the system. 
Once Karzai’s re-election is confirmed, he will find himself 
under strong pressure to mollify the opposition and make 
concessions in terms of power sharing. Some former 
opponents, including Ali Jalali who had been one of the 
opinion poll leaders, have already announced their support for 
Karzai and will likely be rewarded with appointments. Karzai 
appears intentioned to create a number of supra-ministerial 
positions, such security and reconstruction ‘tsars’ and possibly 
a prime-ministerial post, to the benefit of the highest profile 
challengers. However, he would retain the power to sack any 
of these as it suits him. As in the past, either the opposition 
will be fully co-opted into Karzai’s patronage system, or any 
post-electoral honeymoon between Karzai and the reformers 
will soon be over. Once having sacrificed their credibility to 
the ‘political necessity’ of making a deal with Karzai, the 
former opponents could easily be discarded and marginalised. 
For what polls are worth, Jalali has for example already lost 
almost all the public support which he had enjoyed until 
April, before he decided to drop from the race.
Karzai, moreover, will have to reward at least some of those 
who supported him during the campaign, a list which includes 
countless regional and local strongmen, politicians and state 
officials. The Taliban will be watching in amusement while 
Karzai tries to square the circle, trying to squeeze some value 
out of an exercise which from the perspective of winning the 
war in Afghanistan will probably be recognised one day as 
having been mostly counter-productive. 
Last year, some observers and policy makers floated the 
possibility of not having the elections at all in 2009 and 
replacing them with a ‘Loya Jirga’, or assembly of community 
leaders. Karzai was apparently inclined towards such an 
option. ‘Loya Jirgas’ are easy to manipulate for incumbents, 
since in most cases determining who is a ‘community leader’ 
is a rather arbitrary decision. The legitimacy deriving from 
the Jirga would have been very modest, but might have still 
been greater than that derived from an obviously fraudulent 
electoral process. In reality, however, the Loya Jirga option 
never had much of a chance, because it would have been 
interpreted, abroad even more than in Afghanistan, as an 
admission of the defeat of the international coalition. There 
has been much talk, particularly in Washington and London, 
of adopting more realistic aims for international intervention 
in Afghanistan than creating a democratic and functional 
Afghan state. This, however, is easier said than done. A 
minimalist strategy, stripped of all ‘ideological’ aims, might 
now sound attractive in the West, but what will it have to 
offer to those Afghans supposed to be increasingly bearing 
the burden of fighting the Taliban? There would be little 
else left for them than a role of mercenaries in somebody’s 
else war, and mercenaries do not have a strong record of 
winning wars. 
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